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Broadening without Intensification:
The Added Value of the European
Social and Sectoral Dialogue
ABSTRACT ▪ The framework of the European social dialogue (ESD) has
enabled interest organizations at the European level to conclude agreements
on a wide range of social policy issues. This applies both at the inter-sectoral
level and within the various sectors, and has led in the last few decades to
the creation of a large number of joint texts. This article addresses the issue
of the added value of these results for the parties concluding them. It is
argued that the ESD does not constitute a system of industrial relations at the
European level, but serves as an alternative lobbying channel for the social
partners involved.
Introduction
In his inaugural speech to the European Parliament in 1985, Jacques
Delors — the newly appointed Commission President — said: ‘I put the
question: when shall we see the first European collective agreement? I
want to insist on this point: the European collective agreement is not a
slogan’ (Tyszkiewicz, 1999: 39). It is clear that Delors had high hopes
when he invited ETUC, UNICE and CEEP to joint discussions in Val
Duchesse in 1985.
However, not all of Delors’ expectations have been met. Even after the
introduction of a legal framework for European social dialogue (ESD) —
which enabled the social partners to conclude agreements to be submit-
ted to the Council for approval as directives — no agreement comparable
to what is understood as a collective agreement in most national contexts
has been concluded. However, this is not to say that nothing at all has
happened: over the years, the European social partners in both the inter-
sectoral and the sectoral social dialogue produced (up to August 2002)
268 official outcomes.1
This article discusses the framework for ESD and the results that have
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been produced.2 The question is: if European collective agreements have
not been concluded, why have there been so many outcomes? The next
section presents a brief introduction to the ESD and addresses the ob-
stacles to the establishment of social dialogue committees and to the
achievement of results. There follows a discussion a number of crucial
methodological points concerning the research project from which the
empirical data for this article were drawn. We then discuss the content of
the results achieved within the framework of the ESD; in other words,
we seek an answer to our research question. Finally we summarize and
conclude the article.
European Social Dialogue: Characteristics and Obstacles
The Maastricht Treaty: Towards the First ‘Euro-collective
Agreement’?
The Single European Act (article 118b) marked the insertion of ‘social
dialogue’ in the acquis communautaire. In 1992, the Maastricht Treaty
was adopted, along with a social protocol signed by all Member States
except the UK. In effect, this committed all signatories to the protocol as
though it were part of the Treaty. In 1997, after the Labour Party took
office in the UK, the protocol was included in the Treaty. What is now
Article 136 of this Treaty states that: ‘the community and the Member
States . . . shall have as their objectives the promotion of . . . dialogue
between management and labour at European level’.3 To this end, the
social partners were assigned the right to be consulted on any
Commission proposal in the field of social policy. Moreover, and more
importantly, it opened up the possibility for the social partners to
conclude agreements on these issues and to request the Commission to
submit such agreements to the Council as proposed directives. The other
option for the social partners is to implement an agreement through the
member organizations, using the national systems of industrial relations.
Articles 136 to 140 entrench these procedures in the Treaty Establishing
the European Union and lay down the conditions of the ESD. It should
be emphasized that these procedures apply not only to the above-
mentioned inter-sectoral organizations, but also to the European peak
organizations in the various sectors.
Using the ESD procedures, the social partners in the inter-sectoral
dialogue have so far reached five framework agreements, namely on
parental leave (1996), part-time work (1997), fixed-term work (1999),
telework (2002), and most recently (October 2004) on work-related
stress. The first three have been implemented as directives by Council
decision. Strikingly, they have been coined ‘Euro-collective agreements’
European Journal of Industrial Relations 11(1)
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(Falkner, 1997: 7–8), which implies that the wish of the Delors
Commission has come true. The fourth and fifth agreements result from
article 138 consultations, which allow the social partners greater
autonomy to implement and monitor the agreement themselves. The
agreement on telework has so far been implemented only in the electric-
ity sector and in local and regional government. In the sectoral dialogue
up to 2002, 16 framework agreements were concluded in various sectors;
some officially confirm the establishment of a social dialogue, while
others regulate working time. A number of these working-time agree-
ments (in sectors temporarily excluded from the general directive of
1993) were implemented as Council directives, while in other cases the
social partners preferred to let their national affiliates implement the
agreement.
Although these framework agreements are indeed collectively
concluded agreements, they are not like any form of collective agreement
as commonly understood in the traditional (i.e. national) conception. The
scope of the issues is much narrower, they do not concern wages and their
practical impact remains limited, especially for the more advanced
welfare states. The minimum provisions laid down in the agreements are
usually far below those that are already in place in the individual coun-
tries (Dølvik and Visser, 2001; Keller and Bansbach, 2001: 424–5).
If we define industrial relations as a system of strategic choice, collec-
tive action by labour, business and governments, their mutual relation-
ships of conflict, cooperation and power, affecting the content and
regulation of employment relations (Visser, 1996: 2), it seems that this
has not developed at the level of the EU. Although agreements are in
fact concluded, the subjects addressed cover only a small part of the
content and regulation of the employment relationship, and the actual
impact remains limited. From a neo-functionalist perspective, the
opposite could be expected. Since the conclusion of the Maastricht
Treaty, the range of social issues that can be determined by qualified
majority has been broadened. On the assumption that this would create
spill-over effects for adjacent policy areas — in this particular case, in
the area of industrial relations — the expectation could reasonably have
been that this would lead to the development of a ‘European industrial
relations system based on supranationally organized classes’ (Streeck,
1994: 167), including collective bargaining on the content and regulation
of employment relations. However, this is clearly not the case. In other
words, the ESD should not be considered a system of industrial
relations.
This is contrary to what is argued by Jensen et al. (1999). While
acknowledging that the effects on workers and employers of what they
refer to as ‘European IR regulation’ is limited, and that there are large
differences between European-level organizations and procedures and
de Boer et al.: Broadening without Intensification
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national systems of industrial relations, they argue that there are
important parallels with the structures and mechanisms in the national
systems of industrial relations. The presence of a number of actors, a
number of rules and procedures, and a number of results can — in their
view — be seen as a starting point for a system of industrial relations
at the European level. It should, however, be emphasized that these
actors do not directly represent workers or employers, and that the
rules and procedures that are in place do not allow the results to cover
issues that have a substantial impact on working conditions in the
Member States.
Obstacles to the Development of a European Social Dialogue
Two main factors may explain why there has been only a limited
development of a European system of industrial relations. The first is the
diversity across countries with respect to national sectoral boundaries,
the representative structures of interest organizations, and the insti-
tutional structure and traditions of industrial relations. If national
sectoral domain definitions do not coincide, this presents serious diffi-
culties in organizing an ‘action set’ of interest organizations pursuing a
common purpose at EU level (Visser and Ebbinghaus, 1992: 208).
Moreover, the national member organizations often have very different
organizational and representative structures. This applies both to trade
unions and — arguably to a greater extent — employers’ organizations
(Lanzalaco, 1992: 193–200). For example, some national affiliates of
European employers’ associations are trade or lobbying organizations
rather than employers’ associations, and are thus not mandated to
address social issues, which immediately calls into question the legiti-
macy of joint texts concluded within the framework of the ESD. These
differences in sectoral domains and representative structures originate in
the variation across countries in the institutions and traditions of indus-
trial relations (Rhodes, 1995: 115–8). Differences in the degree of
centralization and coordination within the national systems of industrial
relations are reflected in differences in the dominant level of social
dialogue in a country. The authority of national federations and associ-
ations, or the extent of ‘vertical integration’, differs widely across trade
union movements in the various Member States, and this can cause
problems of mandate and implementation in the sectoral dialogue
(Visser and Ebbinghaus, 1992). In brief, cross-national differences
inhibit the establishment of representative structures at EU level capable
of concluding framework agreements.
The second and perhaps more important issue is that because the social
agenda of the EU is substantially narrower than at national level, the
power of the Commission to cast a ‘shadow of hierarchy’ over ESD is
European Journal of Industrial Relations 11(1)
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very limited. The Commission as a third party to the social dialogue is
much more constrained than are national governments in its capacity to
force the other two parties to negotiate. Although the Maastricht Treaty
opened the possibility for qualified majority voting for more subject
areas than was previously the case, many issues remain subject to 
unanimous voting or are explicitly excluded from European regulation.
As a result, the scope for European social policy is quite restricted and
thus the bulk of social and labour market policy is still developed at
national level (Ebbinghaus and Visser, 1997). For interested organizations
this implies that the most appropriate level at which to address these
issues remains the national one. There is no strong incentive to discuss
social and labour market policy at the European level, since there is
simply a lot less to be gained. Social partners ‘shoot where the ducks are’,
and most ducks swim around in national ponds. This is particularly
relevant to the involvement of the inter-sectoral social partners in social
policy development in the EU, through the co-decision procedure,
although it also applies to the sectoral dialogue. As there are no means to
‘bribe’ European peak organizations to come to the bargaining table, as
there are in national corporatist systems, they retain their ‘power of non-
decision’ (Streeck, 1994).
No Added Value, No Social Dialogue
In the light of the wide cross-national differences and the Commission’s
limited ‘shadow of hierarchy’, it is clear that the success of ESD depends
on the voluntary cooperation of at least two parties, that is, employers’
organizations and trade unions. If either is unwilling, there will be no
favourable prospect for the development of a fruitful dialogue. It has been
observed that problems are often found in the representation of employ-
ers’ interests (Keller and Sörries, 1998a). In the words of Streeck (1994:
170), European employers, like employers generally, prefer markets to
institutions, and free markets to regulated markets. But agreements on
social issues will be concluded only if both employers (associations) and
employees (unions) see a distinct added value for themselves. In the end,
the decision of the social partners to engage in social dialogue hinges
predominantly on their perception of potential benefits. If there seems to
be a lack of such benefits at European level, it is not worth the effort to
overcome the above-mentioned problems of diversity. The potentially
powerful position of the Commission as the initiator of social policy that
can force the social partners to come to the bargaining table (Keller and
Bansbach, 2001: 427) is constrained by the EU’s limited social agenda.
The evident question is why one would want to discuss issues, or even
negotiate agreements within the framework of the ESD, if a more
favourable outcome can be achieved through other channels available in
de Boer et al.: Broadening without Intensification
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the multi-level system of European policy development, principally the
national system of industrial relations.
Taking into account these obstacles to the development of a European
social dialogue one may be surprised to see that in addition to the frame-
work agreements mentioned earlier, up to August 2002 a total of 243 joint
statements were concluded in the inter-sectoral and sectoral dialogue.
Moreover, while the social partners in some sectors are apparently very
active in concluding joint statements, so far those in other sectors have
not even established the necessary dialogue committee. The conditions
under which ESD develops are discussed in this article. Since it has been
made clear above that social dialogue will not occur if either of the social
partners does not perceive an added value, our research question was
formulated as follows: what is the added value of the ESD for the sectoral
social partners, and why has it developed in particular sectors and not in
others?
Methodology
The empirical evidence presented in this article originates from a research
project on the ESD carried out by Amsterdams Instituut voor Arbeids
Studies (AIAS) in 2002 (Benedictus et al., 2002). In the project, two
methods were used to gather empirical data.
First, all joint texts and framework agreements drawn up before
August 2002 were extracted from the EC and the CIRCA websites4 and
entered into a database. This was designed to store all documents that had
been produced by joint committees and informal working groups (pre-
1998) and by the sectoral social dialogue committees (post-1998).5 Any
joint text drawn up and endorsed by both sides in the social dialogue is
described as a ‘result’ of the ESD. The following fields (in addition to
title, organizations involved, date, etc.) are included in the database:
• The status, namely whether or not a joint text contains binding obli-
gations. If it imposes certain commitments on the signatory parties it
is termed a ‘framework agreement’. Conversely, when a joint text
comprises informal commitments, recommendations or anything else
without direct binding power on the parties involved, it is termed a
‘joint statement’. It should be stressed that these joint statements are
concluded on a wide variety of occasions, for example: when consulted
within the framework of the ESD regarding a specific proposal for a
directive on social policy; when commenting, on their own initiative,
on a specific Commission Green or White Paper (not necessarily on
social policy); when expressing their concern about an issue that has
not yet been addressed by the Commission but which they feel
European Journal of Industrial Relations 11(1)
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requires European-level policy action; and when making non-binding
recommendations to the member organizations. It should be empha-
sized that this list is not at all exhaustive.
• The policy area, namely the main subject addressed in the joint text.
In the first instance, the classification drawn on the Commission
website was used. For those results achieved after June 2000, the
CIRCA (EU Communication and Information Resource Centre
Administrator) website was used, and the policy area was assigned
after reading the full text. The policy areas distinguished are employ-
ment, working conditions, working time, training, health and safety,
social dialogue, studies and statistics, enlargement, and policy and
economy. It should be stressed that in many cases these individual
labels do not cover all subjects addressed in a joint text, since these
often contain elements of more than one policy area. ‘Policy and
economy’ seems to be a category used by the Commission to classify
all texts that do not fit any of the other policy areas. Results in this
category in most cases contain comments on particular policy
proposals made by the Commission, or on the economic situation.
• The purpose, namely whether a joint text is targeted at European
politics (the Commission, the Council or all national governments) or
at the affiliates of the European peak organizations. In the former case,
the European social partner organizations advise European policy
makers on the aim and contents of a specific policy proposal, within
the framework of the consultation procedure laid down in the Treaty,
or on policy-making in a specific area in general, on their own initia-
tive. In the latter case, European organizations advise their members
— either with or without binding force — to take a certain course of
action.
In addition, five case studies were carried out, involving a total of 23
semi-structured interviews. Sixteen of these were with representatives of
European peak organizations in various sectors. Other interviews were
with Commission functionaries involved in the ESD (two interviews),
representatives of the inter-sectoral dialogue (three interviews) and
experts on the ESD (two interviews).
The research addressed the development of the social dialogue over
time, taking into account all joint statements and framework agreements
on all policy areas, in four of the sectors: commerce, construction, metal
and telecommunications. Within the constraints of the research project,
the cases were selected in order to display the widest possible range of
situations: sectors with many joint results (telecoms, commerce) and
those with few or no results (metal, construction); private-sector (metal,
commerce, construction) and public or former public sectors (telecoms);
sectors with predominantly large firms (metal, telecoms) and those with
de Boer et al.: Broadening without Intensification
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predominantly small and medium-sized enterprises (construction,
commerce); those with much sector-specific European policy (telecoms,
construction) and those with little or none (metal, commerce).6
In the fifth case, the responses of the five transport sectors to a single
European policy initiative — the Working Time Directive of 1993 — were
compared. This case provided not only crucial information about the
Directive, but also valuable additional insights into the research question.
Opportunities and Influence for the Social Partners at EU
Level
Despite the obstacles to the development of the ESD mentioned in the
introduction, a substantial number of results have been achieved within
its framework. Table 1 reveals two major facts, that the ESD had spread
to 28 sectors by 2002, and that the number of results each year generally
increased during the 1990s but subsequently declined.
Starting from the observation that social dialogue will develop only if
both parties perceive an added value, it is clear that where a sectoral
dialogue committee has been established and results have been achieved,
both the employers’ organizations and the trade unions thought that
there was something to gain by achieving a result. Since one single result
should thus have advantages for both sides, this is obviously a shared
added value.
Market Liberalization Creates Common Goals
A striking fact illustrated by Table 1 is that the vast majority of results
were achieved between 1992 and 2000, with a strong peak in 1996/7. A
priori this could reflect the ongoing liberalization of the European
market for various public services, such as telecommunications, postal
services, gas and electricity, and transport. Table 2 shows that, indeed,
three of these sectors are among the top four in terms of the number of
results. The second highest number of results is in agriculture, which can
be considered an exceptional case since the first result in this sector dates
back to 1978, and between that year and 1986 this was the only sector in
which a dialogue committee existed.7
A closer look at the results achieved in the telecommunications,
railways and postal sectors reveals some striking similarities. The vast
majority (61 out of 72, or 85 per cent) are joint statements and are
targeted at one or more institutions at EU level. Moreover, the content
of 76 per cent of the results in these sectors is categorized by the
Commission as ‘employment’ or ‘policy and economy’. In practice, these
joint texts usually voice the concerns of both social partners about the
European Journal of Industrial Relations 11(1)
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TABLE 1. Number of Sectors with at Least one Result and Number of Results per Year
Year 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002a
Sectors with at 
least one 
result 
(cumulative) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 4 4 7 8 9 12 14 15 19 23 24 24 26 28 28
Total results 1 1 1 4 3 0 1 0 5 0 8 0 6 10 13 19 10 14 30 37 20 10 22 11 2
Note: a To August.
Source: Benedictus et al. (2002: 47).
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position of their sector. In many cases, these statements are targeted
directly at the Commission and often entail comments or recommen-
dations on liberalization policies and their expected effects on the
competitive position and the employment situation in the sector. In other
cases, these comments target liberalization policy more generally, but the
practical concerns are the same. It seems that the liberalization of previ-
ously shielded markets gives employers and employees a common goal:
employers fear a loss of competitiveness for their own (formerly monop-
olistic and public) companies, while the unions fear loss of employment
as a result of strong competition from new entrants. Companies in these
sectors — which often are heavily burdened by large investments in infra-
structure (cable networks, railway lines) — will experience the most
drastic change in their environment as a result of liberalization. In
railways, these competitive pressures not only develop within the sector,
but are also exerted by ‘other modes of transportation’, such as road
transport or inland waterways, as is emphasized in numerous joint state-
ments. In effect, the concerns about competitiveness and employment are
two sides of the same coin. By concluding these statements, and by
addressing the Commission, the social partners try to influence the
content of European regulation. The added value of the ESD for employ-
ers and employees seems to be the entry it provides into the policy
process in the EU.
European Journal of Industrial Relations 11(1)
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TABLE 2. Number of Results per Sector
Sector Results Sector Results
Telecoms 32 Sugar 5
Agriculture 26 Journalism 4
Postal services 20 Construction 3
Railways 20 Public services 3
Civil aviation 16 Textiles/clothing 3
Sea fishing 14 Woodworking 3
Commerce 13 Banking 2
Maritime transport 10 Electricity 2
Cleaning 9 Insurances 2
Horeca 9 Leather 2
Private security 7 Agency work 2
Inland navigation 7 Personal services 1
Footwear 6 Tobacco 1
Road transport 5 Entertainment 1
Source: Benedictus et al., 2002: 54.
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European Social Dialogue as an Alternative Lobbying Channel
The observation in the previous section can be broadly generalized by
extending the scope of analysis to all sectors and to all results achieved
within the framework of the ESD. When considering the distribution of
results by status, it is clear that voicing common opinions is greatly
preferred negotiating binding agreements: there have been 243 joint state-
ments but only 21 framework agreements. It was shown above that the
framework agreements in the inter-sectoral dialogue cannot be equated
to collective agreements. This leaves 17 framework agreements concluded
at sectoral level. The case study on the Working Time Directive shows
that three of these were a direct result of pressure from the Commission
and contain stipulations on the maximum number of working hours.
Although these results are arguably the most far-reaching in the sectoral
dialogue, they are not comparable to encompassing collective agree-
ments. The other framework agreements in the sectoral dialogue appear
to be mutual commitments to the establishment of a sectoral dialogue
committee or the continuation of social dialogue, ‘formal’ recommen-
dations on employment issues in the sector, or guidelines on telework-
ing. The content of these agreements shows that the impact on employees
in the Member States will most likely be small or non-existent.
Three-quarters of all joint statements are targeted exclusively at EU
politics, which means that these results are in no way intended to commit
the national affiliates to anything, but are targeted purely at influencing
European policy in some way. If one adds those statements that are
targeted at both the member organizations and EU politics, the percent-
age is even higher, 85 per cent (see Table 3).
The results in the other categories hence constitute only 15 per cent of
the total. Those targeted at the member organizations could be
considered collective agreements were they to contain binding elements;
but what distinguishes a joint statement from a framework agreement is
the absence of such elements. Examination of these texts reveals that they
usually contain quite general statements on such issues as child labour,
de Boer et al.: Broadening without Intensification
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TABLE 3. Target of Joint Statements
Target
EU politics 184
Member organizations 25
EU politics and member organizations 24
Parties issuing the statement 10
Other 1
Source: Benedictus et al., 2002: 48, 52.
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fundamental labour rights, training, lifelong learning, technology,
violence and crime, racism and xenophobia, and health and safety. In no
way do these results commit the signatories to anything beyond the
endorsement or denunciation of certain practices.
Table 4 supports the conclusion that the members of the European
peak organizations have come to view the framework of the ESD as an
alternative channel for lobbying; the results in all sectors show a picture
similar to that in the three sectors discussed in the previous section. Those
categorized as ‘policy and economy’ represent 40 per cent of the total
results in the sectoral dialogue, while together with those categorized as
‘employment’ these account for 52 per cent of the total. It should be
emphasized that the subjects addressed in these results are not in all cases
those social issues listed in Article 140 of the Maastricht Treaty; in fact,
many of the subjects cannot be considered ‘social’ at all.
Table 4 shows that 33 results (14 per cent) are categorized as ‘working
conditions’, which at first sight might lead one to believe that these are
indeed results covering issues related to the content and regulation of
employment relations. However, further investigation provides contra-
dictory evidence: the subjects addressed range from early retirement in
the agricultural sector to combating child labour in the footwear sector,
and although both subjects are certainly relevant to the employment
relationship, 30 of the 33 results in this category are joint statements and
thus do not contain any elements binding on the signatory peak organiz-
ations or on their national affiliates. Moreover, the aim of the majority of
the results categorized as ‘working conditions’ does not differ from that
of those categorized as ‘policy and economy’ and ‘employment’. In fact,
16 results in this category are targeted exclusively at European politics,
while another five are targeted at both European politics and member
organizations. This implies that almost two-thirds of these results are in
some way intended to influence European policy. A good example in this
category is a joint statement issued by the social partners in the road
transport sector on 20 February 1990, which offers their opinion on the
Commission’s proposals concerning the use of top sleeper cabins in
European Journal of Industrial Relations 11(1)
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TABLE 4. Results per Policy Area
Policy area Results Policy area Results
Policy and economy 92 Social dialogue 16
Working conditions 33 Working time 15
Employment 27 Studies and statistics 4
Training 21 Enlargement 2
Health and safety 18
Source: Benedictus et al. (2002: 59).
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heavy goods vehicles. Because such cabins reduce the effective loading
length of these lorries, the statement is intended to persuade the
Commission to increase the fixed overall lengths to compensate for the
decreased loading lengths and thus for the potential economic losses for
the sector. So, although the name of the category may lead one to believe
otherwise, the content and target of the majority of the results catego-
rized as ‘working conditions’ show that these do not differ much from
those in ‘policy and economy’ and ‘employment’.
The 16 results categorized as ‘social dialogue’ mostly entail a commit-
ment to establish or continue a social dialogue in the particular sector. In
the commerce, woodworking, cleaning, tobacco, sugar, and hotels,
restaurants and catering (Horeca) sectors, this has even been formalized
in a framework agreement. The other ten ‘social dialogue’ statements
generally concern the informal mutual recognition of each other as a
social partner.
The categories ‘training’, ‘health and safety’, ‘studies and statistics’ and
‘enlargement’ speak for themselves. None of the results in these
categories is a framework agreement,8 nor does any resemble a collective
agreement. In fact, most results in these categories are aimed at influenc-
ing EU policy on these issues, in some cases in response to proposed
policy measures, in other cases on the initiative of the social partners
themselves.
The case studies conducted in the various sectors further confirm that
particular policy measures may trigger ESD in a sector. A case in point is
the European Working Time Directive of 1993, which provided for
maximum working time and minimum rest periods for all workers in the
EU, apart from certain sectors exempted from its stipulations. The
exemptions covered in particular road transport, inland navigation,
railways, maritime transport and civil aviation, because of the atypical
nature of the employment of mobile workers in the transport sectors.9
Interview respondents from most of these sectors confirmed that the
Commission put substantial pressure on the sectoral social partners to
negotiate agreements on working time suited to their particular sector.
By securing the adoption of the original directive, the Commission had
proved its ability to achieve European-wide regulation on this issue. The
explicit threat ‘negotiate, or we’ll legislate’ led to the conclusion of frame-
work agreements in railways, civil aviation and maritime transport, the
last two being transformed into a directive by Council decision. Negoti-
ations in road transport and inland navigation broke down in 1998, and
for these sectors the Commission kept its promise to regulate the issue
via the normal legislative procedure (Weber, 2001). The majority of joint
statements and framework agreements in the category of ‘working time’
are directly related to the EWD.
Construction is a sector in which comparable developments have
de Boer et al.: Broadening without Intensification
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occurred. Here, the two joint statements in the working conditions
category both comment explicitly on the European Posted Workers
Directive of 1996. As regards the establishment of a dialogue committee,
an interview respondent from this sector mentioned that: ‘the growth of
the EFBWW [European Federation of Building and Wood Workers ] was
caused by an increasing importance of European regulation, in particu-
lar the Directive on health and safety in temporary and mobile work-
places. This convinced the national affiliates that the European level
mattered’. With respect to the position of the employers, the same
respondent argued that ‘the thought was that if we want to break into the
legislative process, we are stronger together than alone’. Thus, the reason
both employers and employees wanted to establish a social dialogue and
to conclude joint statements is clear: they wanted to influence European
policy, rather than to negotiate autonomous agreements on social issues.
Conversely, the fact that EU policy measures have not had a great
impact on the metal sector may partly explain why a dialogue committee
has not been established. Once particular measures had been proposed
by the Commission (e.g. the block exemption regulation for the garage
sector10) or there had been sector-specific international developments
(e.g. the termination of the ECSC treaty in the steel sector), the social
partners in the relevant parts of the metal sector started to apply them-
selves to establishing a sectoral dialogue committee to address these
issues. The presence or absence of either European sector-specific policy
or European general policy with sector-specific consequences is therefore
an important explanatory factor behind the establishment of an ESD
committee and the achievement of results. If Council directives, policy
proposals, White or Green Papers have a potential effect on a sector, the
social partners frequently use the ESD as a channel for access to the
policy process in order to promote their sectoral interests. In most cases,
this does not concern social or employment policy issues at all.
Laeken: The Future of the ESD in Non-binding Agreements
In December 2001, the social partners in the inter-sectoral dialogue set
out their vision on the future of the ESD in the Laeken Declaration. In
this declaration, they opted for more emphasis on autonomous, bipar-
tite dialogue aimed at the conclusion of voluntary, non-legally binding
agreements. The social partners thus more or less ruled out the possi-
bility of concluding framework agreements to be submitted to the
Council for implementation as a directive. The conclusion of, respec-
tively, the telework agreement in July 2002, and the work-related stress
agreement in October 2004 confirms the new course announced in the
Laeken Declaration. Agreements on telework concluded earlier in
commerce and telecommunications indicate that some sectoral dialogue
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committees share these views. Interview respondents in other sectors
indicated that their ambition is still to conclude legally binding agree-
ments on certain issues. According to a representative of the railways
sector, ‘if safety is to be guaranteed, in order to be enforceable, it has to
be legally binding’.
The declaration by the inter-sectoral social partners confirms that the
direction in which the ESD is developing is clearly away from the path
of legally binding agreements. While it has been shown that in terms of
actual results, this path has not been much trodden before, this formal
statement obviates any further prospects for the conclusion of European
collective agreements, and further confirms the non-existence of a
European system of industrial relations. By focusing on more voluntary
agreements, the inter-sectoral social partners more or less confirm the
limitations imposed by the cross-national diversity identified in the intro-
duction to this article. Without a realistic threat of legislation enabling the
Commission to pressure the social partners into negotiations, and with
the wide differences on a variety of aspects of employment regulation
both between and within countries, it seems unlikely that many frame-
work agreements will be concluded in the future, let alone implemented
by Council decision. In its communication on the ESD in 2002, the
Commission stated that the social partners will have to make the first
move towards negotiating a framework agreement, thus implicitly
affirming its refusal any longer to steer the ESD (EC, 2002: 8). Both the
Commission and the social partners thus endorse the path of voluntary,
non-legally binding agreements.
This type of regulation fits well with the direction in which EU social
policy formation in general is moving. Alongside the development of
the European Employment Strategy, which originates in the White
Paper on Growth Competitiveness and Employment of 1993, new
policy procedures have been developed to strike a balance between
cross-national variety and the achievement of common goals. These
‘soft law’ procedures generally combine the setting of a number of fixed
targets for all Member States with substantial freedom for the individual
States in deciding how to achieve these goals. Policy experiences are
exchanged, which should enable mutual learning processes, and peer
pressure (‘naming and shaming’) should guarantee compliance with the
commonly agreed targets. Since the Lisbon Summit in 2000, this type
of regulation has been termed the open method of coordination
(OMC).
But while the soft character and the basic concept of ‘same targets,
different paths’ are quite similar in both methods, there is one crucial
difference that poses a serious problem for the viability of the ‘new-style’
ESD. While OMC relies on national governments for implementation of
its targets, the implementation of agreements in the ESD relies on the
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institutions of industrial relations in the various Member States. Cross-
national differences will play an even more important role in the ‘new-
style’ ESD than when implementing an agreement through Council
decision, which is carried out by the national legislators. Given the
problems of the level of bargaining authority and representative struc-
tures identified in the introduction, the legitimacy of these agreements is
open to debate. Altogether, it is clear that the ESD has not developed, and
most likely will not develop, into a system of industrial relations at the
level of the EU, nor does the conclusion of a ‘genuine’ European collec-
tive agreement seem to be likely in the near future. However, this is not
to say that the ESD is an empty shell.
The true value of the ESD seems to lie in the entry into the European
policy process it provides the social partners. It has been shown that the
framework of the ESD has provided the sectoral social partners with an
alternative channel for promoting their shared sectoral interests. The
ESD has not developed into an alternative or complementary level of
industrial relations or collective bargaining, but has taken a position
within the European multi-level system of policy development. The
influence the social partners can exert through this channel is not limited
to social policy (as it is in the consultation procedure laid down in the
Maastricht Treaty), but extends to anything within the Commission’s
competences. As such, the most important value of the ESD is that it
provides the social partners with a degree of influence in the European
policy process.
Broadening without Intensification: So What?
It is beyond doubt that the social partners, employers as well as employ-
ees, perceive an added value in the framework of the ESD. On a general
level, both the number of sectors and the number of results increased in
the 1990s. However, these results do not resemble anything like a national
collective agreement. The issues addressed are rarely ‘social’ and the texts
are usually aimed at influencing European policy (in many cases
economic policy) in some way, rather than at concluding agreements on
the content and regulation of the employment relationship at the level of
the EU. In other words, the expectation of former President Delors that
the establishment of the ESD was a first step towards collective bargain-
ing at the European level has not been met.
The obstacles posed by cross-national diversity and by the
Commission’s small ‘shadow of hierarchy’ can only be overcome if the
social partners perceive an added value in engaging in social dialogue at the
EU level. In response to the research question ‘what is the added value of
the ESD for the sectoral social partners, and why has it developed in
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particular sectors and not in others?’, it has been shown that especially in
the sectoral dialogue the possibilities provided by the framework of the
ESD have enabled the social partners to voice their opinion on virtually
any legislative proposal at the EU level that has an impact on their sector.
Because the number of subjects that fall under the competence of the EU
is continuously increasing, the ESD might prove a good way for interest
organizations to retain some influence over these issues, and can as such be
considered an alternative lobbying channel for their sectoral interests. In
fact, it is precisely this feature that constitutes the added value of the ESD
for the social partners. If there is no EU policy with an impact on a particu-
lar sector – in other words, if there is nothing to influence – there is no
incentive for sectoral social partners to establish a social dialogue. This may
largely explain why the social partners in the metal sector, for example,
have so far not made an effort to overcome the obstacles posed by cross-
national differences and to establish a sectoral dialogue committee.
The Laeken Declaration does not change this: it signalled the formal
recognition of the limitations of the social partners to conclude legally
binding framework agreements. In the ‘new-style’ ESD, they no longer
aim for implementation through Council decision, but favour the use
of voluntary bipartite agreements, to be enforced through collective
negotiations by the national affiliates. It should be emphasized that this
does not change anything as regards the conclusion of joint statements,
nor has it any necessary impact on the sectoral dialogue. The ESD as
an alternative lobbying channel thus remains untouched, and as such,
in an EU characterized by an opaque multi-level policy environment,
it may even be argued that this type of involvement of interest groups
in the European policy process will strengthen the legitimacy of
decisions.
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NOTES
1 Since the completion of data-analysis for this article, the European
Commission (2004: 5) has reported over 300 outcomes.
2 For other recent interpretations of the European social and sectoral
dialogue, see Compston and Greenwood (2001); European Commission
(2004); Falkner (1993) and Keller (1993).
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3 In several language versions, the English ‘management and labour’ appears
as ‘social partners’.
4 URL: www.europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/soc-dial/social/
euro_agr/index_en.htm and
forum.europa.eu.int/Public/irc/empl/esdo_accords_europeens/home
5 In 1998, the Commission reformed the ESD, requiring all dialogue
committees and informal working groups to ‘reapply’ for official
recognition as a sectoral dialogue committee (EC, 1998). In all sectors
except inland navigation this resulted in a continuation of the social
dialogue.
6 Atypical sectors such as local authorities and agriculture (which has a very
specific background as regards its position in the European integration
process and policy development) were avoided. Larger sectors were
favoured over smaller.
7 In agriculture, railways, inland navigation, commerce, road transport, civil
aviation, sea fishing and maritime transport, a ‘European social dialogue’
already existed before the Maastricht Treaty. The inter-sectoral social
partners also concluded their first result before 1992.
8 The draft framework agreement of May 2004 on ‘work-related stress’, now
formally adopted, will fill this gap. In addition, in 2002 a framework for
actions on the ‘lifelong development of competencies and qualifications’ was
agreed, in which the social partners expressed a proactive commitment to
promote training and lifelong learning. However, the practical impact of this
statement of policy on the development of the ‘knowledge’ economy is not
clear at the time of writing.
9 Other groups such as doctors in training were also exempted, but these were
not covered in our research.
10 This is an instrument to exempt a particular type of agreement in the garage
sector from Article 81(1) of the Consolidated Treaty, which bans agreements
that could have anti-competitive effects. According to the Commission, the
previous regulation did not sufficiently facilitate competition between car
dealers, and disadvantaged consumers. The regulation on this issue
(1475/95/EC) expired in September 2002, and the new Commission
proposal entails a number of changes that are supposed to increase
competition in the sector.
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